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The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights proclaims that every- 
one has the right to seek and to enjoy 
in other countries asylum from perse- 
cution. In the fortieth year of the 
Convention, the Hong Kong govern- 
ment has introduced an  eligibility 
procedure for the determination of 
refugee status for Vietnamese asylum 
seekers arriving in the territory. The 
primary objective of the procedure 
was to deter asylum seekers. It was 
introduced because Western States 
have in recent years become less 
willing to resettle refugees from Hong 
Kong. There has also been an assump- 
tion made that most of those now 
arriving, do so for economic reasons. 
The procedure came into effect on 
June '16, 1988. Since that date, 10,000 
boat people have arrived and will be 
interviewed by the Immigration 
Service. The Immigration Service 
makes a decision on the asylum 
seekers's status according to the 
UNHCR definition of a refugee (as 
explained in the UNHCR Handbook). 
To date, of 313 cases examined by the 
Immigration Service only 2. have been 
found to be "deserving" of refugee 
status in their own right. 
Clearly the theory is that a greater 
deterrent is presented to those still in 
Vietnam if fewer people are successful 
in their applications for asylum. It is 
with this in mind that the Immigration 
Service administers the procedure. Of 
perhaps greater deterrent value is the 
fact that all asylum seekers arriving 
since June 1988 and those who are 
determined not to be deserving of 
refugee status, are detained in closed 
detentions camps. They have no 
prospect of resettlement or freedom. 
At the present rate, it is likely to take 
seven years to deal with the current 
case load. Once refused, applicants 
are classed as illegal immigrants and 
they are detained pending repatri- 
ation to Vietnam. There is in fact no 
plan to forcibly repatriate the 
Vietnamese and any such proposal is 
most unlikely to be forthcoming. 
Those refused therefore await an 
uncertain future in detention, with 
1997 on the horizon. Or they can 
volunteer to repatriate. One is forced 
to ask the question how voluntary can 
a decision to repatriate be, when one 
is faced with such bleak alternatives. 
It cannot be correct that so many 
people are still risking their lives and 
their futures. It cannot be right that 
the people leaving, whatever their 
motives, are undeserving of 
protection or even of basic human 
rights. If a policy such as this is so 
clearly unfair, is it possible for the 
UNHCR to work to improve it? 
Ought not the UNHCR be challenging 
the very existence of such a policy? 
The Agreement 
The statement of understanding, 
reached between the Hong Kong 
government and the UNHCR 
concerning the treatment of asylum 
seekers arriving from Vietnam in 
Hong Kong, came into effect from 
September 1988. It states that the 
Hong Kong government will apply 
appropriate humanitarian criteria for 
determining refugee status, taking 
into account the special situation of 
asylum seekers from Vietnam. The 
agreement provides a questionnaire 
designed by UNHCR to form the 
basis of Immigration Service 
interviews and to reflect the elements 
of the criteria used for determining 
status. In the agreement much 
emphasis is placed upon the UNHCR 
handbook as a means to interpre- 
tation of the 1951 Convention, but in 
essence, and in practice, a very rigid 
definition of refugee is used, i.e. well 
founded fear of persecution as 
applied in other states. The Hong 
Kong Immigration Service subse- 
quently embraced this definition in a 
very inflexible way that probably was 
not foreseen in the agreement. 
UNHCR confirmed in the agreement 
that they had been consulted on the 
criteria to be applied and that it 
would brief immigration officers 
involved in the determination proce- 
dure. At this briefing UNHCR was 
satisfied that the criteria were to be 
applied in a generous manner al- 
though this later proved to be an 
unfounded assessment. Three 
months after the commencement of 
the agreement the Immigration 
Service declined UNHCR's offer of a 
further training session. 
The agreement facilitated a 
procedure for cordial discussion 
between UNHCR monitoring officers 
and the Immigration Service. This 
was intended to establish broad 
agreement on the sort of cases which 
should be granted refugee status. 
This spirit of co-operation quickly 
deteriorated. 
To some extent there was a trade- 
off in the agreement, in that eligibility 
procedure was only part of the 
change in the treatment of refugees in 
Hong Kong. The Hong Kong 
government agreed to the immediate 
and progressive opening of the 
refugee centres which had been closed 
since the earlier deterrent policy, 
attempted in 1982. It is unclear to 
what extent UNHCR's involvement in 
monitoring the eligibility procedure 
was contingent on the liberalization of 
the closed centres. 
The Hong Kong 
Immigration Service 
It seems clear that the Hong Kong 
government has taken a policy 
decision to "screen out" asylum 
seekers. It has applied a very 
rigorous interpretation of the United 
Nations refugee definition, and their 
starting point is that new arrivals are 
economic migrants. These 
assumptions are supported by the 
statistical evidence, by conversations 
with the Immigration Service officials, 
by an examination of those 2 cases 
which have been "screened in" and 
theoretically in that the more 
"screened out", the greater the 
deterrent. 
UNHCR monitoring offices found 
it hard to argue with Immigration 
Service decisions to "screen out" in 
many cases where such an argument 
was based on the information 
contained in the Immigration Service 
files. Often the file on a particular 
case contained so little information 
that no decision either way would 
normally be possible. The 
Immigration Service interview of the 
asylum seeker is of a very poor 
quality. 
The interview is conducted in 
three languages. The immigration 
officer asks the questions on  the 
questionnaire in Cantonese, this is 
translated by the official Hong Kong 
Government interpreter into 
Vietnamese and the response passed 
to the immigration officer. 
The notes are then made by the 
immigration officer in English. The 
Hong Kong Government interpreters 
are required to pass a proficiency test, 
but their Vietnamese is often 
inadequate. All left Vietnam before 
1975, and so have little knowledge of 
recent language usage under the 
current regime. All are ethnic 
Chinese and there are also regional 
language differences. Many 
immigration officers deviate from the 
questionnaire to ask more probing 
questions but some do not. It is quite 
common to see a questionnaire with 
ten or more consecutive negative 
responses, though it is hard to believe 
that an asylum seeker has absolutely 
nothing to say. Some of those who 
have been interviewed state that the 
immigration officer shouted at them 
and UNHCR's monitoring officers 
did witness this in some cases. 
Without doubt the interview is 
not carried out in the most relaxing of 
atmospheres. From having spoken to 
the immigration officers, it is clear 
that the majority carry out the inter- 
view with the assumption that the 
asylum claim is bogus and that the 
applicant is an economic migrant. 
Questions are often aimed at finding 
discrepancies so as to discredit the 
applicant rather that to corroborate or 
consolidate information. In Hong 
Kong generally there is an atmos- 
phere of hostility towards the 
Vietnamese and the "screening" 
procedure only serves to strengthen 
this. 
Given the nature of the interview, 
there is great doubt as to the ability of 
the applicant to adequately express a 
well founded fear of persecution. 
Nevertheless, it forms the basis on 
which the Immigration Service makes 
a decision. The file is then passed to 
senior immigration officers and chief 
immigration officers to make an  
assessment and final decision. The 
file is minuted with their opinions 
and reasoning. The asylum seeker is 
then informed and can lodge an 
appeal within fourteen days. So far 
all those screened out have appealed. 
When the asylum seeker is informed 
of the decision to refuse, only in a 
small minority of cases are the 
applicants given reasons for the 
refusal. At this stage the file is passed 
to UNHCR, who are responsible for 
the preparation of grounds of appeal. 
UNHCR can intervene at any 
time, if it feels there is a strong case to 
be made: These interventions and 
grounds of appeal are considered by 
the Immigration Service, who are 
then able to reverse their decision. If 
the decision is not reversed, the file 
moves up  to the Security Branch, 
where grounds of appeal are 
considered. The final decision to 
refuse rests with the Governor of 
Hong Kong in Counsel. There is no 
independent body examining the file at 
any stage. There is no provision for a 
hearing or  the making of oral 
representations. 
The United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees 
UNHCR entered into the 
agreement to monitor the screening 
procedure with an apparent lack of 
preparedness. Six consultants were 
hired as  monitors, although no 
thought was given to the provision of 
interpreters. Much time was spent by 
the consultants hiring interpreters 
from abroad and at the time of 
writing only three were in post. This 
meant that only three consultants 
were able to monitor the Immigration 
Service interviews. As UNHCR was 
obliged to take on appeals, the 
consultants with interpreters were 
even more thinly stretched and were 
able to monitor less than 20 per cent 
of the interviews. The Hong Kong 
Law Society agreed to provide legal 
services for the preparation of 
grounds of appeal. Due to the 
expense of their services, their 
inexperience in refugee law and lack 
of knowledge on Vietnam, and the 
fact that they endorsed many 
immigration decisions rather than 
challenged them, UNHCR decided to 
cease the arrangement. This meant 
that UNHCR's consultants for a short 
time did appeal interviews with those 
screened out to prepare grounds of 
appeal. Whilst this gave consultants 
a wealth of information on Vietnam 
and a better understanding of the 
reasons for leaving Vietnam, it did 
mean they were over-stretched. The 
lack of interpreters also proved a 
constant barrier to full working 
capacity. 
UNHCR proceeded to hire four 
additional consultants to prepare 
appeals under the aegis of a 
voluntary organization based in 
Hong Kong. At the time of writing, 
no appeals had been decided by the 
security branch. 
At an  early stage UNHCR 
consultants contacted local lawyers 
on the possibility of making 
applications for Judicial Review. It 
was felt that the procedure, as  
described, inadequately protected the 
refugee's rights and the application of 
UK precedent case law, though 
Judicial Review of the procedure was 
one means by which the process 
could be improved. Authoritative 
legal opinion on the prospects for 
Judicial review suggested that the 
failure of the screening procedure to 
permit legal representation at the 
initial Immigration Service interview 
stage fell short of the civilized 
standards required under the 
Convention and to be expected of the 
Hong Kong government. Judicial 
Review proceedings would have a 
reasonable prospect of success. A 
fairer procedure, it was suggested, 
would allow a legal representative to 
make an interview with the asylum 
seeker contemporaneous to the 
Immigration Service interview. 
Representation would then be made 
to the Immigration Service, which 
would make a decision on eligibility 
in the light of its own assessment and 
the legal representations. The 
discrepancies that inequitably arise 
could then be ironed out before a 
decision is made. 
UNHCR made clear to the 
consultants however that Judicial 
Review would not be appropriate at 
such an early stage in the policy and, 
besides, UNHCR would not want to 
be seen to be directly'endorsing an 
application for Judicial Review in a 
confrontation with the Hong Kong 
government. 
Consultants found that when 
they made appeal interviews with 
those "screened out", substantial new 
information came to light that the 
Immigration Service interview had 
failed to obtain. When faced with 
this new information, the 
Immigration Service did undertake to 
re-interview the appellant. This 
however would further prolong the 
process beyond the seven years 
suggested above. More fundamental 
to the spirit in which the process was 
functioning is that great doubt was 
cast upon the new information by the 
Immigration Service given that it 
came after the refusal and after those 
refused had time to talk to friends 
and to UNHCR's consultants. 
At one stage a senior 
immigration officer stated to one of 
the consultants that the Immigration 
Service could neither trust UNHCR 
nor its interpreters not to feed the 
asylum seekers with a good story to 
strengthen their cases. 
UNHCR had a number of 
meetings with senior officers at the 
Immigration Department intending 
to establish a dialogue as to which 
cases UNHCR felt were deserving of 
refugee status. It was also hoped that 
procedures, interviewing techniques, 
background information on Vietnam, 
etc. could be improved. These 
meetings were held in an atmosphere 
of polite diplomacy through they 
bore little fruit in terms of any 
improvement in the recognition rate. 
Following high level missions to 
Hong Kong by staff from Geneva, the 
High Commissioner made diplomatic 
advances to the Hong Kong 
Government, stating that current 
practices and recognition rates were 
unacceptable. It remains to be seen 
what response this will elicit. 
The Refugees 
For those seeking asylum who 
have already been detained since 
June 1988, conditions in detention 
camps have deteriorated. In 
Chimawan and Hei Ling Chau, the 
camps where screening has been 
taking place, an  atmosphere of 
insecurity and hopelessness has 
grown up. There has been fighting in 
both camps. Ostensibly this is 
between people from Haiphong and 
people from Quang Ninh but 
certainly there are underlying factors. 
Some say there are criminal elements 
in the camps who fled to avoid 
prosecution in Vietnam, or who were 
released from jails there. All say thai 
people in detention have nothing to 
lose, they fear justifiably that they 
will be screened out, and so certain 
elements establish protection rackets 
to intimidate other inmates. Many 
people have been injured in the 
fighting, some very seriously. 
At the start of February asylum 
seekers started to boycott the 
Immigration Service interviews and 
UNHCR appeal interviews. They feel 
there is no point in attending and 
hope that this protest will express 
their anger at this unfair system. At a 
meeting organized to discuss these 
issues, refugees in Chimawan told 
UNHCR consultants that they stood 
together in their search for asylum, 
that all or none should be recognized 
as refugees. They asked UNHCR noi 
to become involved in supporting 
individual cases, but to support them 
en masse. 
Conditions in the camps are very 
poor and crowded. There is no 
privacy, little education provision and 
limited recreation facilities. A 
considerable proportion of the camp 
population are children, growing up 
behind double high fences topped 
with barbed wire. For the lengthy 
time periods expected, these 
conditions are quite unacceptable. 
There is a large body of opinion 
which argues that UNHCR should 
have fought more strongly the closed 
camp deterrent policy introduced in 
Hong Kong in 1982. As a deterrent, it 
did not work but did cause 
unnecessary suffering for a large 
number of people. It is hard to see 
anything of benefit to asylum seekers 
in the policy introduced by the Hong 
Kong government in 1988. Given that 
it is not possible to deport those 
screened out back to Vietnam since 
the Vietnamese government refuses 
to allow forced repatriation; given 
that it is not safe to return people to 
Vietnam against their will due to 
threats of further persecution against 
them; given that it is  deemed 
necessary for UNHCR to monitor 
even those that return voluntarily to 
see that they are not prejudiced; and, 
finally, given that illegal departures 
from Vietnam are seen as  a 
punishable crime against national 
security, it does seem premature to 
introduce any sort of eligibility 
procedure. It is doubtless true that 
many of those detained since June 
1988 are not refugees within the strict 
UNHCR definition, nevertheless, it is 
not possible and not safe to return 
them. Accordingly, they must still be 
given protection and at the very least 
temporary asylum pending safe 
repatriation or resettlement else- 
where. 
Since the procedure as outlined 
above is so unfair, less than one 
percent have been given the 
protection of refugee status and the 
process takes several years, it is 
disgraceful that UNHCR condones 
the detention of 10,000 innocent 
people in such inhuman conditions. 
Detention of asylum seekers has been 
in principle condemned by UNHCR, 
yet there appears to be very little 
willingness to challenge detention in 
Hong Kong. 
Even if the process by which the 
refugee definition is applied were 
fair, and an attempt was genuinely 
made to find those with a well 
founded fear of persecution for 
Convention reasons, there must still 
be considerable doubt about the 
terms of the definition itself, and 
indeed the appropriateness of 
applying any definition at all in such 
a situation of a large scale influx. 
Many applicants do not fall within 
the definition and a perfunctory 
examination of cases might elicit 
primarily economic reasons for 
departure from Vietnam. This, 
however, is a naive assessment, but it 
is one which those in the Immigration 
Service in Hong Kong have found 
easy to exploit in making decisions to 
refuse asylum. 
Many asylum seekers experience 
harassment, discrimination and 
deprivation of the right to earn a 
living as a result of having been 
classified as  bad elements or as  
counter-revolutionary. This can be 
due to either relatives before them 
who had links with the South 
Vietnamese army, the United States 
presence, or the French Colonial 
presence, or due to having made 
previous escape attempts. As a result 
of this classification, families are 
subject to capricious treatment by 
local authorities, children may be 
removed from school, parents may be 
denied permission to go fishing or to 
gain access to local co-operatives. As 
a result, they are forced into private 
enterprise, and this in turn is frowned 
upon and access to goods at official 
prices can be denied. This forces 
reliance on a black market, and this is 
illegal; so goods obtained can be 
seized. 
There appears to be a cycle of 
oppression of which the above is but a 
brief example. Because Vietnam is a 
very poor nation and has a very 
restrictive and oppressive political 
system, most persecution of those 
leaving does take place on an  
economic level. Those with any 
power to persecute do so in part for 
their own economic gain, and because 
they too are poor. Bribery and 
corruption are therefore rife, but if 
one looks below the surface, there are 
frequently quasi-political elements 
beneath. To say that the Vietnamese 
are leaving simply for better economic 
opportunities misses this point 
entirely. People leaving for lack of 
religious freedom and those who 
refuse to fight in Kampuchea are also 
part of the case load. This religious 
aspect is well documented and the 
occupation of Kampuchea has been 
condemned by the United Nations 
itself. 
For all of these reasons, the 
UNHCR definition is inappropriate. 
Those now arriving are in need of 
protection and durable solutions. It is 
wrong to use the 1951 definition - 
the cornerstone of UNHCR's 
existence, as  a means by which to 
deter asylum seekers. Countries of 
resettlement must continue to provide 
asylum outside of Hong Kong, but 
more importantly, emphasis must be 
turned to Vietnam, to examine the 
reasons why people are still leaving 
in such large numbers. It is contrary 
to place the burden of the solution on 
the people already in need of 
assistance, without addressing the 
reasons for their departure. Greater 
efforts should be made to bringing 
Vietnam back into the international 
community, to improving the 
economic situation and human rights 
in the country. "Screening" can only 
be applied when it is possible and 
safe to return those determined not to 
be refugees to their country of origin. 
"Screening" can only be functional 
when it is procedurally fair. 
Essentially, UNHCR ought never 
to have agreed to participate in this 
policy. It is doubtful whether 
continued involvement will improve 
a fundamentally unjust procedure. To 
condone government policies of this 
nature will only serve to spread the 
sort of restrictive measures we are 
witnessing in Europe and North 
America to other regions. Since the 
policy requires the long term 
detention of large numbers of people, 
it is unlikely that other states in South 
East Asia currently turning away boat 
people, will change their practice. If 
UNHCR is to retain credibility as a 
humanitarian organization working 
to protect asylum rights, it must 
challenge governments where 
injustice is done, rather than condone 
that with which it does not agree. 
Simon Ripley was legal consultant to 
the U N  refugee commission until 
February 1989, when he resigned and 
wrote the opinion which we now publish 
(the italics are ours). He is now working 
with the United Kingdom Immigrants 
Adviso y Service. 
News in Brief 
Immigration Minister Barbara 
McDougall issued special 
minister's permits to refugee 
claimants Hussein Mohamoud 
from Ethiopia and Nasrin Peiroo 
from Iran, whose claims were 
initially rejected at preliminary 
hearings. This followed reports 
that refugee claimants from 
Somalia, India and Nigeria, 
deported earlier on from Canada, 
could not be located after their 
departure by concerned 
monitoring groups. 
Forty-four new members have 
been appointed to the 
Immigration and Refugee Board 
chaired by Gordon Fairweather to 
deal with the refugee backlog. 
Over 115,000 claims, which had 
not been determined before the 
new refugee determination 
process came int effect on January 
1, 1989, await to be resolved. 
Twenty-eight of the new members 
will be working in the Toronto 
~ & o n a l  Office, since most 
backlog claimants reside in the 
Metropolitan Toronto area. 
Twelve members have been 
appointed to the Montreal 
Regional Office and four to the 
Vancouver Regional Office. Two- 
member panels, consisting of a 
member of the Immigration and 
Refugee Board and an  
Immigration Adjudicator, will 
hear each claim for refugee status 
and apply the definition of a 
Convention Refugee to the facts 
and circumstances of each case. 
It suffices for one of the two-panel 
members to rule that the claim 
has a credible basis to ensure the 
confirmation of refugee status. 
The Board will begin hearings 
after the completion of an  
intensive training course for the 
new members. 
Three new members have been 
appointed to the Convention 
Refugee Determination Division 
(CRDD) of the Immigration and 
Refugee Board. These include 
Centre for Refugee Studies 
research associate Lisa Gilad, who 
will be reporting to the Montreal 
Regional Office from 
Newfoundland; Paul Matarazzo, 
who will be reporting to the 
Toronto Regional Office from 
Thunder Bay; and Sherry 
Makarewicz, who will be 
reporting to the Calgary Regional 
Office from Edmonton. These 
new additions bring the total 
member contingent of the Board 
to 167, including the Chairman, of 
whom 145 are assigned to the 
CRDD and 21 are assigned to the 
Immigration Appeal Division. 
including 19 children and seven 
pregnant women, was stopped by 
the Coast Guard just a few yards 
from Miami's luxury Fisher 
Island community. The passen- 
gers were immediately interned 
by the INS at the Krome Avenue 
Detention Center, where they 
joined sever hundred other 
Haitians, including boat people 
who had reached the US in 
December. Following inter- 
vention by the Haitian Refugee 
Center, the children and pregnant 
women were released to relatives, 
but many family members remain 
in detention. By the middle of 
April, some 750 people, most of 
them Haitians, were being held in 
Krome, a facility designed to 
house 525. [from Haitilnsight, 
- 
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sailboat with 261 passengers, 
THE VIETNAMESE ASSOCIATION F TORONTO 
and 
THE GREATER VIETNAMESE R FUGEE 
ASSISTANCE OMMITTEE 
request the honour of your presence 
at the tenth anniversary celebration of 
Operation Lifeline 
and reunion of former sponsors, 
former refugees and others involved 
in the assistance of the Boat People 
Sunday, June 25th, 1989 
3:00 pm to 6:00 pm 
Holy Rosary Church 
354 St. Clair Avenue West, Toronto 
(next to St. Clair West Station) 
